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REVIEW OF FOREiGN POLICY - II
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mr. President:
In recent weeks members of the Sanate have add.res sed themselves
to the question of the need for a review of

th~

foreign policies of the nation.

When I discussed the question here in the Senate on January 2 0th, I made this
statement:
I intend to raise the issues of foreign policy
on the floor at intervals throughout the session . I hope
to do so in the spirit of national responsibility and without challenging the integrity or the pat.riotisrn of any
individual o r the political party now in control of t_hc
Executive Branch of th~ government. I will b(; only too
glad to give credit, whc:e credit is due . By th~ same
token, however, I do not propose to ignore or glcs s
over the shortcomings, weaknesses and inadequacies of
foreign policy as I se e them.
Mr. President, it is in that spirit that I shall attempt to make a
contribution to the review today.
Let me begin by saying that I believe that the;re is o nly one valid
justification for the enormous and costly responsibilities which this country has
assumed throughout the world in the last decade.

Peace for this country has

become increasingly inseparable from peace everywhere.

The fate of our free-

dom is linked to that of freedom elsewhere in the world.
I do not share the views of those who contend that some sort of
mystical world leadership compels us to act abroad in every situation.

I do not

agree with those who hold that we must asG crt this l eadership by flexing our

- 2 nuclear or vocal muscles at the slightest provocation.

Nor do I agre e with

those who argue that this same leadcrsh1p requires us to spend billions simply
to prove that we are m o re generous than the Russians.
On the other hand, I have no comrr.on ground with those who 1gnore
the vast changes wh1ch have take n place in tha international po::lition of the
United States.

We are in this world -- this small, crowded, dangerous and

promising world - - whethe r we like it or not.
splendor will insulate us fr om its currents.
appealing one, that nin<.tet. nth century

No ancient dream of is o lated
That was a

dr~am

fin~

dream and an

of a safe and contented America,

removed from the troubles of the rest of the wo rld.

It has not been the l e ade rs

- - Republicans or Democrats - - in the White House or the Department of State
who have shattered it,

Rather, it has be e n the sc4entists and the te chnologists

of whom this country has produced its share and of whom we arc justifiably proud.
For those -- and I belie ve only a few remain -- for those who still persist in
that dream of isolation, unmoved by the jet planes and guided missiles overhead,
I suppose there will be no awakening except for that instant of reality before some
nuclear holocaust blasts us all into extinction .
What I am trying to say is that the United States cannot escape
from the r ealities of this era of human histot<y .

If we cannot

r<..tr~at

into a

nonexistent Fol'trt::s s America, however, neither can we charge out in every
direction with bombast, billions or bombs.

If we are to have eff(;.ctive policies,

it seems to me that we cannot assum e that ..!ither action or inaction in for e ign

policy is of itself good or desirable.

We have got to measur e every major
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activity against two general standards.

Does the activity contribute to the

preservation of peace and the security of freedom?

Does it contribute to these

ends in reasonable degree commeneurate with the costs?
It is against those two standards that I ask the Senate today to

examine with me the policies which we a r e following in Southeast Asia.
not lack for information on the situation there.
form e d a great public

It is a region,

the region.
visit~d

in

servic~

rec~nt

We do

The American press has per -

in keeping the nation infcrmed on developments in

m~1reov(..r,

which Senators in increasing numbers have

years so that even from within our own midst we have several

first-hand observations .
I recall meeting the distinguishldd mincrity l~ader /Mr . Knowland7
there in 1953 and I know that th~ able Senatur from Washington j_M1·. Jackson/
has only recldntly returned from the area.

Others who come readily to mind as

having visited the area in recent years include the Senator from Rhode Island

{M.r . Gree!!.?·

the Senator from Iowa j_M r . Hickenloope.:_7, the Senato r from New

Hampshire !_~fr. Bridge_!/, the Senator from Illinois {M.r . Dirksen/, the Senator
from New Jersey {M.r . Smit~7. the Senator from Louisiana {M.r. Ellend e.:_7, the
Senator from Washington [M.r. Magnuson/, th~ Senator from Kentucky {M.r.
Clements 7, and others.
Until r ecent years Scutheast Asia has been on the whole remote from
our awareness.
sov~reignty,

Except for the Philippines over which this country exe r cised

the area was la r gely a pr-eserve of the European powers.

For

decades and in some cases centuries, ancient nations of the region were colonies,

- 4 The United Kingdom held Burma, Malaya, Smgapore, Ceylon and others.
Indochina, the French were predominant.

In

Indon.;sia was under Dutch control.

The Portuguese ruled in several areas .
Whatever its virtues, colonialism

produc~d

the enmities of inequality.

It produced Lhese enmities in varying degrees among all the peoples of Southeast
Asia.

It produced them generally in direct ratio to the reluctance of the European

powers to provide avenues to eventual equality and freedom for these peoples.
Let us face that fact in all honesty.
never bury it until we are prepared to face it .
of Asia became colonial preserves.

The past is past but we shall
There w<::re reasons why regions

It will not serve the cause of present

understanding fvr us in the Western world to delude ourselves \l..ith the pious
belief that onl y selfless motives led to the expansion of Western influence into
Asia.

There were such motives to be sure; but there was also the excessive zeal

for gain and power which characterized the Western nations, including Russia,
in the nineteenth century .
By the same token, it will not serve the cause of present understanding
for this generation of Asians to ignore the shortcomings which existed in their
countries at the time they became colonies .

Nor will it serve that cause for them

to turn their backs now on the real social and economic contributions which the
Western nations have made to their societies.
It comes with particular ill-grace to find the present Soviet leaders

attempting - - as Messrs. Khrushchev and Bulganin did on their recent Asian tour
- - to find them attempting to pour salt on thea e old sores of colonialism.

Have
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they forgotten that their forebears were among the most voracious in extending
Western domination in Asia?

And for all their words about national independence,

there is little indication that the present Soviet
predatory habits of their fathers.
tangible evidence that they have.

lead~rs

have abandoned the

We will look in vain in Cuntral Asia for some
What subject people of the Russians

hav~

dir ect

contact with the new Asian nations to the south and cast?
Whatever may have b eet> the situation prior to World V'ar II, the fact
is that Western colonialism is deatl o r dying throuehout Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asia of yesterday is no mo r e .

The

Where once there were colonies, there

ar e now free nations -- some t e n of them within a compass marl<od roughly by
China on the north, tho:: Pan:: c o n the east, Australia on the south and India on the
west.
ThiJ r .;gion of Southeast Asia is the size of Western Europe and is
even less populated.

It is rich in minerals

a~d

petroleum and it contains some

of the most fertile agricultural lands in the world.
Although

~ach

is a diotinct

n.~t~onal

entity, the

~ounlries

of Southeast

Asia
A.r~J

linked by ties which grow out of a common heritage and many common prob -

lems.
world.

Together these countries make U? one of tht.:: major political r egions of the
And together wtth other peoples in A!Jia and Africa - -new nations and

nations coming into being -- they constitute a powerful force in the flow of world
events .
That was the significance of the na11dung Conference of Asian African nations last year.

It was not, as som0 treated it, a popularity contest

- 6 between the Soviet Union and ourselves.

It is true that we were criticized by

several of the nations at the conference and we wcr..: praised by others .
were the Russians.

We were

elat~d

So, too,

at the praise and d1smayed by the cntlcism.

So, too, presumably were the Russians.

I supposl.l that is understandable .

It

seems to me, however, that if we wish to develop sound policies, we would do
well to concern ourselves less with applause and criticism which are the food
and gall of actors and more with the
countries.

d~eper

!orces which are ope rating in these

We can hardly hupe to comp--te with lhe Russians as actors; I trusl

that thoc;c responsible fur thz conduct of this nation's foreign policy can excel
them in statesmanship and sincerity .
The deeper forcl.!s which motivate Southeast Asia Wl.lre clearly re vealed at Bandung and they are refle<'ted in the p0licics of virtually all the
nations of that region.

They are forces which arise from a deep devotion to

national independence, from a desire for progress in a material sense and from
a more distant, but noneth .... lcss real, goal of

~t:sponsibl(;

and humane government.

These aro forces powerful and swcepmg enough to drive millions of people into
action.

There are other factorc; -- ideologies and dream:; of

for example.

These

af£~..-ct

thl.! situation in Southeast Asia.

anci~..-nt

grandeur,

'Th<'y sometimes tend

to obscure the hasic forcl.ls hut they do not change them.
National independence, matcri<:>.l progress and rcspvnsible and humane
government - - these art! th .... drives whtch
east Asia during the past decade.

hav~

spurred the vast changccs in South-

And th .... y •vill c<,ntinu ... tc dominate

developments in that r egion in the decades thal lie ahead.

- 7 The policies of this country must take these forces fully into consideration.

They must also take into conside1 at ion still another factor.

Each

government in Southeast Asia has its own concepts 0f how to pursue its national
objectives.

Sometimes these concepts will not be in accord with our own .

there are variations between their

vi~ws

and uur s as to h ow to proceed, we can

propound, we can propose, and w e can palliate .
afford to take, in all duo r e spect to their

There is one course we cannot

incep ~ ndence

and our national dignity.

Wi! cannot aff0rd to follow a foreign policy based on pique or
words of this Asian leader or that.

When

plcasur~

with the

What wr.., r\o now in uur relations with South -

east Asia will have a significanc e for this country long after thu contemporary
l eade rs both there and here have passed fr om th e scene.
Mor ~

important than curr{;nt diso.g;:eements ove r .nethods and per-

sonalities is the !act that

th~re

is nolhing inconsistent a s between the objectives

of the Southeast Asian peoph: and our

l ong -rang~::

interests.

Their objectives ar e

in many ways a replica of our own basic national as pi rations .

We too have

struggled through re 11olution and wars to establish and to preserve national
independence.
our history .

We too havl! sought mate rial progress from the ea rli est days of
We too have worked to p0rf-.!ct our political institutions .

As the n e w nations of South'-ast Asia progress toward their basic
objectives, this nation gains 1n the process.

Why is that the case?

To begin

with, one of our principal concerns witn respect to Southeast Asia is a s e curity
interest.

It is a legitimate interest, for it was into the weakn<..ss of Southeast

As1a that the militarists of World War II pcndratcd as a pr econdition for their

- 8 attack on the United Stat o:::s .

As the Southeast Asian nations strengthen the bases

of their independenc e , our own security is increased.
We also have an interest in the material development of Southeast
Asia.

The people of Asia are not without their genius and creative energy.

Their magnificent achievements of the past - - and there are many ·- suggest
the dynamic contribution which these people can make to the general enrichment
of mankind in the modern era.

Out of their development, moreover, can come

growing opportnnities for mutually bene ficial trade and exchange.

Our total

commerce with Western Europe , an area of comparable size and population, was
over $7 billion in 1955.

With Southeast Asia, it was $3 billion.

The difference

only begins to suggest the ultimate possibilities of trade if Southeast Asia
develops in an economic sense.
We have finally an interest in the political progress of Southeast Asia.
Let me emphasize, however, the distinction between interest and interference in
It is one thmg to look with sympathy on the adoption of American

these matters.

concepts of democracy by others.
to them.

It is another to attempt to sell these concepts

A number of the new governments of Southeast Asia reflect the influence

of the American Constitution, the Declaration of Inde pende nce and other great
state papers.

That is a mark of recognition of the universality of our greatest

political minds.

It ought to be a suurce of both prid0 and humility to this

generation of Americans.

It is a disgraceful disrespect, however, to talk of

exporting our system of gove rnm e nt or the A·neric'ln way as though it were some
article of commerce to be marketed by Madisc,n Av· nuc.

- 9 Let the Chinese and oth..:r communist nations persist in that false
sense of mission which requires them to force their own peculiar systems on the
unreceptive.

It does not serve the interests or the dignity of this country to

suggest that we emulate it.
There arc signs that over the past decade the Southeast Asian
count r ies have movii!d towa-rds a ll th r ee of their basic objectives.

I bas.: this

observation on my vis;t t<"' Southeast Asia last fall and on reports by othe r
Congt·~s3

members of

and by press cor r e:spondents .

unmistakable signs of progr..:ss .
internal o r der now pr evails

o

The r 0 are l imited but

In most countries a tolerable measure of

Th<:l great thr<..at of a communist Tr'! il itary adv ance

through Indochina into the balance of Southeast Asia has receded, at l east for
the moment.

Production of crops is rising .

New industries are being developed .

Commodities from Japan and the Western nations are appearing in the mar kets
of Southeast Asia in increaned supply .

Perhaps most significant, free elections

were held last year in virtually ev..;ry count r y in the region .

In s ome cases,

these were the firs t general elections wi th unive r sal suffrage eve r to take pl ace
in these nations .

Whatever their sho r tcomings, they typify the zealous sear ch

for more responsible government which is going on in most of the Southeast Asian
countries o
We shall make a tragic error, however, i£ we tak11 the first signs
of progress as assurance of a secure future fe-r Southeast Asia .
long way from that .

T h e are a is a

The shadow of tht:: militant Chin~se colossus still s l ants

across its neighbors to the south.

A l ull iu the conflict in Indochina is no
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guarantee that it shall not be resumed by the communists in the near future.
satisfactory rate of economic

d~velopment

is still lacking in most of the countrh:s,

by

~ven

A

the most dementary standards

Some of thz governments in the area are

plagued by a corruption and in-.:rtia ·.vhich tend to Oj)er. rc.the r than narrow the
gulf between then1 and

the~r

peoples.

W ·::. have, I believe, played some small part in the progress of

Southeast Asia.

Our policies with respect to Southeast Asia have been effective

to the extent that tht:y hav...: b..!en in harmony with thE:: fundamental objectives of
the peoples of that area.

They have been effuctive to the e xtP.nt that they have

supported the d esire for secure national independence, for material progress,
and for r espor1sible political institutivns.
Mr. President, I should like now to turn

to

these policies and to their shortcomings as I see them.

the rrajor aspects of
Let me say first that I

r ecognize that policy for Southeast Asia cannot be divorced from consideration of
policy elsewhere.

The Administration, for example, may have r easons for

continuing -- as it has done --for continuing conversations between an American
Ambassador and a Chines e Communist r epresentative for seven months in Geneva.
There may be reasons, reasons which the Administration has not seen fit to make
public, reasons of which the Senate is not aware.

Nev~rthPll:!ss,

I know that

these conversations must be a cause of uneasiness to many members of the
Senate.
In the same way, they are a source of uncertainty in many countries
in Southeast Asia.

Questions naturally arioe there as wt!ll as in the Senate as to
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where these conversati0ns are leading.

Thay have the effe ct of introducing a

note of uncertainty into all of our policies in that area.
The conversations effect also the large overseas Chinese population
in Southeast Asia, numbc:rin g several millions, who ar e
like Singapore , Djakarta and Bangkok.

s~ttled

in communities

The loyalties of these communities have

teetered betwe: c n Peking and Formosa for a decade .

What this country does or

does not do respecting the Chinese Communist 1·egime exercises a very great
influence on them .
I repeat I dv not question the right o f the Administration to talk with
the Chinese Communists, if it so desires.

I me r el y point to these conversations

as one e xampl e of how act ions by this government presumably made necessary
by conditions e ls e whe re hav-.: an inevitable impact on our policies in Southeast
Asia.

One c ould also point to

olh~.:rs

a5, for e xample, the conditions which grow

out of our clo se relations with Weste rn European natio ns.

These relations have

sometimes led to actions o r s taterre nts affecting Southeast Asia which have been
-- to say the l e ast -- not wdl r ece ived thl.!re.
In the absence of full information, we must assum e that the
Executlve Branch would not make adjustments of this kind if they were avoidable.
It seems to me, how eve r, that even whe n due allo wanc e is made for the

unavoidable, our polici es fo r Southeast Asia remain characterized by an
inad~quacy

of understanding and an inertia of ideas .
Th e principal instrument of p o licy through which we have: attempted

to assist th0 nations of SoutlH. ast Asia in maintaining

th~ir

independence is the
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treaty that bears the r.ame of the region.

At the request of the President, I was

a delegate to the Manila Conft:rencc at which the Southeast Asia ddense treaty
was drawn up.

Togctht;.; r with the Secretary of State and the distinguished

Senator from New Jersey j_Mr. Smit!:7 I signed ~he tr~:aty on h~half of the
United States.

The Senate gave its consent to ratification by a vote of 82 to l.

If the Senate will recall the situahon which existed in 1954 when the
treaty was considered, its significance will

b~

appreciated.

It was signed at a

time when the communist drive into Indochina thr!o:atened to spill over into the
r est of Southeast Asia.

The treaty was int-.!ndcd primarily to rally the will of

other Asian nations to protect their indcpendeoct; and to resist a further advance
o f communist t.:>talitarianism.
I sig.1ed that treaty and I cast my vote for its ratification.
with a full awareness of its limitations.

I did so

~

I signed because I believed the treaty served a usefnl purpose in
terms of this nation's interest in peace and in freedom.
to do so.

1 believe it continues

And so long as we remain a party to it, the obligations which we have

assumed under it must remain inviolate.
Situations changt.:, however, and as they do we must be prepared to
adjust this treaty as well as other policies accordingly.

The principal limitation

of the treaty when it was signed, as it is now, is that it carries too heavy a
relianc e for the defense of Southeast Asia on nations outside the area.

It has,

moreover, yet to secure the participation of nations lik0 India, Burma, Ceylon
and Indon cs i a whose i.nterests in th<! area arc in many ways more. direct than our
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own.

Finally, it has aroused some fears in Southe a st Asia that the o l d ghost

of Western colonialism may emerge in a new form .

These fears are unfounded

but we cannot ignore their effect on the nations which have them .
The limitations of the treaty have never been a secret.
been discuss cd many times in the press.

They have

What disturbs me is not so much the

limitations themselves as the apparent unwillingness of the Executive B r anch to
face them and its inertia in taking steps to deal with them.
In addition

Lo

the Southeast Asia defense treaty, this country is

supplying military aid to a number of countrie s in

th~

building the defenses of their national ind<.;peudence .
of assistance of tnis hnd.

region to assist them in
I have supported p r ograms

On repeatl:ld occasions , however, I have str essed the

need for extreme cautio n and responsibility in employing this arm of foreign
policy .

That such cautiun and responsibility were not being employed became

unmistakably clear to me last summer when I brought to the attention of the
Senate the
s~nate

will

~hoddy
r~call

procodures in allocating funds under these programs.

The

that of some $3 billion appropriated for the year for military

aid, the De.fense Departmt::nt obligated about $700 million, or roughly 25 percent
of these funds, in the last 24 hours of th<..ir expiring autho't'ity to do so .
We have got to fac e the fact that military aid is a two -edged swo r d.
We have been told many times of its virtues.

We have not b<:en sufficiently

alerted to its dangers.
I tell the Senate in all candidness that I was dismayed at some of the
reports from responsible quarters which reached me while I was in Southeast Asia.
According to these reports, not a small part of the

w~apons

used in the Viet Minh
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advance in Vietnam and Laos were of American manufacture.
inlo communist hands via

d-.:f~.;ctions

They had com\!

and d.:deats of forces we had armed, via the

smuggling trade in weapons and by supply hon1 Communist China.
I do not know how significant this factor of

w~apons

supplied by us

being turned against us and friendly nations is in the total picture in Asia.
Perhaps we shall nevc1· know.

One thing is certain, however, that it is not

without significance and I have yet to s.;e those who are 1·esponsiblc for the
administration of thest:J aid programs demonstrate sufficient awareness of its
significance.
I believe this body cannot emphasize too strongly the need of extreme
caution in tendering military aid lo any country.

At the least, I believe we must

make certain that it goes to governments or.ly in quantities and cf a kind that
they can use effectively to med a ge::nuine military threat.

I believe further that

it should go to governments that are striving, as in South VietNam and the
Philippines, to base themselves strongly in their own peoples.
only such governments are

lik~ly

In the long run,

to survive in Southeast Asia and only such

governments make reliable allies.
I turn now to the second major aspect of American policy respecting
Southeast Asia which is aid-other - than-military.

I apologize to the Senate for

tht:! Uije of this cumbersome term but I can finu no other.

Aid - other -than -

military, as I use it, emb races such euphonies as di.rect forces support, defense
support, development assistance, technical assistance, the President's Fund for
Asian economic developml.!nl, all of which hav.! bo.:..en coinC;d to describe various
activities of the government in piClVLJing

assistanc~::

ai.Jroad.

..
- 15 I mention these terms not to embarnass the lexicographers of the
Executive Branch but merely to er.nphasize what I b e li eve to be the major
problem in this aspect of our policy.

The "aid-other-than-military" program

in Southeast Asia, in a phrase, is bogged down in bureaucracy.
I

believ~

of this government,

assistance programs have a place in the foreign policies
provid~d

the emphasis is on mutuality, provided they fill a

genuine need, and provided they are judiciously and e xpertly administe r ed.

I

have seen technical assistance programs run on under a million dollars as in
Nepal several 'years ago .

Tht:re a handful of Amel'ican technicians were per -

forming an admirable service in the interests of that country and the United
States.

I

hav~

s.Jen o thers invelving tens of millions of do llars which were the

height of futility.
I r ..~ peat, I believe this country can serve its own interests as well
as those of Southeast Asian countries through aid programs hut the level of
expenditures is not ' the real measure of utility.
ar e

exp~nd~d

It is the manner in which funds

that is the critical is sue.

I tell the Senate frankly that I am disturbed when I am told - - as I was
told s e v e ral months ago -- by the Prime Ministe r of a Southeast Asian country
that "the

improv~mcnt

in r e latio ns

betw~::en

your country and mine dates f r om the

discontinuance at my requ est of your aid program. 11
What lies behmd a comment like that made in all sincerity by an
outstanding Asian lt;adcr '! How are we to reconc ile this fact with requests fr om
the

Ex~cutiv e

Branch for long - range aid programs and increased expenditures?
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I beli e v e w e mu s t go back to the fundamental drive s in Southe a s t Asia
if w e are to unde rstand th e P rim e Ministe r ' s c o mment and th e existing short comings in the aid program which, inste ad of corr e ctin g , th e Administra ti o n
appears bent on compounding.
The So utheast Asian peoples seek material pr o gr e ss, it is tru e .

T hey

s ee k it, howeve r, within the framework of the ir two other fundamental ubj e ctive s,
within th e framework of national inde pendence and responsible governm e nt.
These objective s - - all of th e m -- c anno t b e r econciled unl e ss the initiativ e for
e conomic development in Southe ast Asia com e s preponderantly fr o m the peoples
of that area .

They do not d es ir e a mate rial progress that i s made to order for

them in the United Stat.:: s, in Soviet Russia, or anywhere else.

They do not

desir e it so desperately thai: the y can b e bought by either sicle.

If the y could ,

they would hardly b e worth the buying.

Aid programs, more ove r, no matt e r how

large the amount, no matter how much scintillating surfac e progr e ss it may
p:t·oduc e , will not serve the int e rests of the pe ople of that ar e a or o ur inter e sts
unless its ben efits reach th e peopl e .

And unless it se r ves the inte r e sts o f the

peopl e and not the few, it do e s not serve our interests.
I regre t to say s o but the argum e nl that is ofte n made to the effect
that we must outbid the Russians in offers of aid to Southe ast Asia refl e cts little
credit on us or on the nation s of that area.

I am sure that the argument is made

in good faith, out of a genuine desire to h e lp.
which demeans us b e caus e it demeans the

It is an argument, how e v e r,

p ~o ples

of Southeast Asia .

The d e c e nt,

the self - r e specting, the ind ~ p e nd e nt in South e as t Asia will r e sent the implication
that they can be bought .

1
• t7 •

The argument that we must outbid the Russians is as invalid as the
demand that aid be limited only to those who agree with us in eve ry instance or
who speak the words which flatter us.

Has this country so departed from its

basic principles, have its citizens so forgotten their training from earliest
childhood that we would make generosity contingent upon a grovelling gratitude?
I do not think we have, but sometimes those who speak of these matters make it
sound as though we have .
If competition with the Russians is not the sole criterion for aid
programs, neither is an absolute alignment with us or an adoration of us -- real
or professed-- the criterion.
lifetime.

P o licies change.

Leaders go on , at most, for a

The real interest-; of this nation -- interests which members of the

Senate must consider and

sa! ~ guard

-- are more e nduring than that brief span.

In these terms, the criteria of any aid program is: does it serve our
interests by aligning itself with the desires of the peoples of Southeast Asia for
1'\ational independence, for material progress, and for responsible and humane
government.

Regardless how amiable the recipients, it does not serve our

interests if it encourages de pendence rather than independence; if it becomes

e. means for irresponsible governments to become increasingly irresponsible.
In general, I believe rational programs of technical assistance, of
this government or the United Nations, administered withvut political strings,
serve the long-range interests of this government.
type of activity when it established the technical

Congress sponsored that

ass1stan~~

program in 1950. It

is the only type of long-rang e continuing grant aid which Congress has ever
endorsed.
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With respect to other aid programs, however, it seems to me that
each situation must be

judg~d

on its merits as it arises.

In certain cases, as

in South VietNam for example, where a difficult economic transition is being
made under constant communist pressure, additional assistance may be
warranted in our interests.

Such aid programs, however, must be clearly

designed to achieve a given purpose over a set period of time.

They should not

carry an implication of a continuing, general commitment by this country.

If other foreign assistance in economic deve lopment is required by
Southeast Asia beyond that which is now available through existing credit
facilities, then it seems to me preferable that it be financed by long-term loans
of the most generous terms, rather than as grants.

Loans carry no implication

o f dependency, and I believe the Southeast Asian nations would prefer them to
grants.

It is strange, to say the least, that the agitation for grants seems to

arise more in the Executive Branch in this country than in Southeast Asia itself.
I should like to turn now to one other question before concluding.
The contention is often made that we must increase not only our military and nonmilitary aid, but also our so-called psychological activity .

I am not sure that I

understand precisely what increasing psychological activity means but I assume it
has something to do with multiplying the output of words printed or spoken since
the United States Information Agency is seeking $50 million in additional appropriations, or a 57 percent increase over the current year.

It would be

interesting to know how many additionaL words can be produc ed for that sum.

- 19 Some years ago the able Senator from Arkansas /Mr. Fulbrigh~/
and the able Senator from Iowa j_Mr. Hickenloope;:,7 headed an investigation of
this program which helped to reorganize it on a sound and reasonable basis.

It

appears now that the Administration desires to return it to a basis of sound and
fury.
There is a place for an intelligent information and exchange program
in supporting and disseminating the foreign policies of this nation in Southeast
Asia.

The Fulbright Program and the Smith-Mundt Program for the exchange

of persons, for example, arc a credit to this nation and to the farsightedness of
the Senators whose names they bear.

The American librarie-s abroad, which

the Senator from Iowa [M.r. Hickcnloope::_7 did so much to safeguard and improv~,
provide valuable services for the country and its commerce and other relations
with thl.! se c ountri es .

I am sure there is even a place for radio and press and

other modern information services in supporting American policies, provided
they are handled with intelligence and restraint.
There is no place for any information program, however, regardless
of its intent, which
part of this nation .

sugge~ts,

by its very magnitude, a cultural offensive on the

To thos e who would say that we should do more in this

connection, I can only r e ply that in my opinion what we are already doing comes
perilously close to the border of excess .

Our desire to make them know is

understandable but in the process we must not cheapen the finest ideals and the
deepest beliefs of this nation.
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I ask the members to consider for a moment certain questions
which I believe will make this clear.

V'hat would ba the reaction in your state or

in mine to occasional visits of Buddhist prit:sts from Cambodia to study at our
universities?

I think we would be honored by such visits, that we would welcoml..!

them, if the visitors lived -- as they would -- simply and unassumingly in our
midst.

I should think we would react the same way if they maintained in our

midst a small library to which Americans could go to study life and
their country.

cultur~

in

The examples could be multiplied but what I am trying to make

clear is that there could be a real utility, an enrichment of our life by activities
of that kind and most of us would welcome it.
But suppose twenty or t:i1irty Caml)odians descended on your state
with the printing pre::; ses, the radios and the other paraphernalia of modern
communications.

Suppose they subjected you day after day, mCJnth after month,

and year after year to an unceasing flow of word!l on the viTtues of Cambodian
life and the evils of some other way.

You might agree, I am sure, that

Cambodian life was indeed virtuous.

But I also believe that you would begin to

wonder why these Cambodians had come to your state and after a while you
would begin to wonder when they were going home.

Should we assume that

Cambodians, Burmese, o r any othe r peoples will act any diffe rently to the
presence in their midst of a substantial body of foreigners or of an offensive of
words whether it comes from the United States, Soviet Russia, or any other
country?

..
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To those that would say that this is a cheap way to stop communism
I can only r eply there is no cheap way nor is there even an expensive way in
Southeast Asia if it depends primarily on the initiative and energy of this country .
No country in that region or any other r egion will avoi.d totalitarianism
primarily through our efforts .

Nations find freedom because they hav(;l the will

to freedom and the native leaders to guide them effectively towards its promise.
We delude ourselves if we believe that we can substitute either for that will
that leadership.

O':'

We will do more harm than good if in Southeast Asia we seek t.

supply our words and our deeds for the words and deeds that must come only
from the peoples directly involved.
Mr. President, I have completed my review of the Southeast Asian
situation.

I should like now merely to summarize the conclusions in t e rms of our

policies to which this review has led me.
l.

The United States should make clear that it stands solidly behind

our present obligations under the Southeast Asia defense treaty .

At the same

time, however, we should also make clear that we are always prepared to consider a reduction in our role in the defense of that area under certain conditions.
The conditions are either a recession in the totalitarian threat to Southeast Asia
or the strengthening of its defenses by the accession of nations more directly
concerned to the treaty or by other defensive arrangements.
2.

The Executive Branch should make a careful re - examination of

the premises under which it dispenses military aid .

It must bring into its

calculations more emphatically than it has in the past such factors as genuine

.. ...
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need and capacity of recipient governments in terms of their defense and the
degree of responsibility which they show to their own peoples.
Further, the Executive Branch should report as fully as possible
to the American

peopl~

on the

cxt~nt

to which American equ:.pment has fallen

into the hands of the communists in Asia.

If it fails to do so in the near future,

then the appropriate committees of Congress might well conside't' a complete
investigation of this matter.
3.

Non - military grant aid as a permanent element of American

foreign policy should be limited, as was intended by Congress,
Assistance or the Point Four Program.

ro

the Technical

If the Executive Branch presents a

prospectus for a useful ancl d!ective expansion of this program - - and I am not
at all sure that this is possible -- thl:ln I believe Congress should give it sympathetic consideration.
Large - scale grants of economic aid to any countr y, when necessitated
by unusual c i rcumstances

I

however, should be considered individually on their

own me r its by the Congress.

If the Southeast Asian and other underdevelcped c0untries seek longr a n ge aid for economic development unavailable through £-xi.:;ting sources

1

such

aid should be considt!red as far as possible lor whole regions a11d on the basis of
repayable credits of the most generous terms.

The Executive Branch should

present specific proposals in this connection and not seek a permanent b l ank
check which reveals little uf the extent to which this country nlight be committed
without the clear understanding of the American people and th e consent of the
Senate and Congress as a wh.ok.

